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The Validity in Colorado of Marriages
by Proxy
BY EDWARD H. SHERMAN*
Marriages by proxy or through the mail may seem incredible and
subject to derision, but no longer are they confined to the scrutiny of a
classroom in domestic relations. With so many of our soldiers abroad
the validity of such marriages has become a matter of great importance.
Our problem may be stated thus: In Colorado may a soldier
abroad enter into a valid marriage with his fiancee, who is in Colorado,
by proxy or correspondence or in any other manner where the parties
are not in each other's presence? Basically, this will depend upon
whether the mere presence of the parties at the time of making a contract
of marriage is an essential element to the agreement between them.
Prior to the decision of Ex Parte Suzanna, 295 Fed. 713 (D. Mass.
1924),' the validity of a marriage by proxy or agent had never been
judicially determined either in the United States or in England. Such
marriages were, however, upheld in the legal systems of many European
countries. Marriages by proxy were permitted in England until the
eighteenth century and became probably a part of the common law of
this country.
In an article published in the Harvard Lat' Review in 1919,2 Pro-
fessor Ernest G. Lorenzen concluded that such marriages are valid in any
state of the Union where common law marriages are recognized.
Toward the end of the first World War the Judge Advocate General of
the Army gave his opinion that a marriage by letter was valid. 3 In an
bpinion announced by a federal court in 1918, it was decided that mar-
riage, like any other contract, may be effected by correspondence alone.4
Further authorities may be added to Ex Parte Suzanna upholding such
*Of the Denver bar.
'The Suzanna case held that a marriage by proxy in Portugal, where such marriages
are allowed, between a woman resident in Portugal and a man resident in Pennsylvania,
was valid in any state where common law marriages are recognized.
'Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws ( 1919), 32 HARV. LAW REV. 473.
3 bid. n. 488. EDITOR'S NOTE: But the following appears in DIGESTS OF
OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, 1912-1930 (1932),
S. 476, p. 227:
"A written contract between a soldier of the American Expeditionary Forces in
France and a woman of Cook County, Illinois, recites that the contracting parties recog-
nize each other as man and wife. The purpose of the contract was to legitimize a child
previously born to them. The War Department can make no authoritative ruling as
to the validity of the purported marriage. Unless it is followed by a ceremonial mar-
riage, as required by Illinois Laws, 1905, p. 317, it will not Ibe recognized as valid in
Illinois. 291.1, Jan. 8, 1919."
'Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683, 166 C. C. A. 181 (8th, 1918).
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marriages when celebrated in a jurisdiction that recognizes common law
marriages.-- Generally, as to a marriage ceremony, the law of the state
where the celebration took place is the law which governs its validity.
Are there established principles of contract and agency, unshaken by
considerations of public policy, to uphold such marriages in Colorado?
MARRIAGE BY PROXY
By Colorado statute marriage is considered as a civil, contract to
which the consent of the parties is essential.6 We have two general ways
of making a marriage: First, the solemnization in the form prescribed
by statute, and second, an informal contract which requires no ceremony
nor solemnization. Colorado law recognizes the validity of common
law marriages. Our statute prescribing formalities for solemnizing mar-
riage does not otherwise nullify a valid informal marriage. 7 Created by
an informal contract, a common law marriage may be by parol or in
writing, without ritual or form, expressed in any manner the parties
desire. All that is required is capacity and the expression of present con-
sent. May an agent make a contract of marriage for his principal which
will be upheld as a common law marriage? If such marriage can be
created by contract alone, established by satisfactory proof thereof, there
is no reason why such contract cannot be made by an agent for his prin-
cipal. If, however, in addition to the contract itself we require cohabi-
tation or habit and repute as further elements to constitute a valid com-
mon law marriage, then obviously an agent cannot make such a contract,
for these elements involve personal factors and would require the pres-
ence of both parties.
It is true that there is a conflict of opinion by the courts whether a
valid common law marriage may be created by an agreement alone, with-
out consummation or cohabitation. 8 While there are a number of cases
in which the court by its language purports to require cohabitation, it
will be observed that in nearly all of them the facts in the case actually
showed cohabitation and the statement was dictum.9 For a case to be
considered as a precedent on this question it would seem that there
should be present no evidence of cohabitation. While some courts regard
this difference of opinion as a difference in measuring the quantum of
proof necessary to prove a common law marriage, it is in a few cases a
rule of substantive law. Actually, the cases are rare which expressly hold
that cohabitation is essential to the validity of an informal marriage.
U. S. v. Tuttle, 12 Fed. (2d) 927 (E. D. La. 1925) ; Silva v. Tillinghast, 36
Fed. (2d) 801 (D. Mass. 1929): U. S. v. Commissioner of Immigration, 298 Fed.
103 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
04 1935 C. S. A.,.C. 107, S. 1.
'Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. A. 503, 50 Pac. 1049 (1897).
33 A. L. R. ANNO. 27 (1924).
'KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE (1922), 116, 138.
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They are based on the theory that marriage is a status which cannot be
obtained until the parties have publicly assumed the relationship either
through a ceremonial marriage or have cohabited and publicly held
themselves out as husband and wife. But this view violates the historical
concept that if a mutual agreement in fact is clearly established by direct
evidence, neither holding out nor cohabitation is necessary to constitute
the parties husband and wife. ' Most authorities agree that under the
common law marriage may be created by agreement without cohabita-
tion. Cohabitation and a holding out add nothing to a legal marriage,
but are merely evidence from which a marriage may be presumed. Logi-
cally this is the proper view, for since "cohabitation" nmeans not merely
sexual intercourse but living together as husband and wife and entails a
lapse of time sufficient to enable the public to judge the relations of the
parties, there would be sexual intercourse before the marriage is com-
pleted, and this would surely be contrary to the real purpose of the
marriage laws.- 1
Our supreme court has not been unaware of this conflict. In Peters
c. Peters, (Re Peters), 73 Colo. 271, 215 Pac. 128 (1923), 33 A. L. R.
24 (1924), it recognizes this conflict and takes the position that the
habit and repute of marriage are not essential but merely evidence of the
essential--consent. 2 Marriage is a contract to be established as any
other contract. Evidence that the parties conducted themselves as man
and wife is some evidence of such a contract; evidence that they did not
is some evidence against it. By the same token consummation or cohabi-
tation are merely evidentiary facts of consent.
a It is true that prior to Peters .,. Peters, the Colorado supreme court
and the court of appeals used expressions that would seem to require the
elements of cohabitation or habit and repute in addition to proof of the
contract. Klipfel's Estate u. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 92 Pac. 26 (1907) ;
Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. A. 303, 50 Pac. 1049 (1899) ; Employer's
Ins. Co. v. Morgulski, 69 Colo. 223, 225, 193 Pac. 725 (1920). But
in the Klipfel case there was no marriage ceremony or any express con-
tract of marriage, and petitioner based his alleged marriage upon evidence
of cohabitation and reputation (page 44). While in the Taylor case the
specific holding was that no marriage was ever contemplated and the
relations between the parties was wholly meretricious, in the Morgulski
case evidence of cohabitation was resorted to merely to show the consent.
101 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1890), S. 315; 27
HARV. LAW REV. (1914) 378 n.; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Reprint 665
[2 Hag. Cons. 54 (1811)]; 2 KENT, COMM. *86; 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th
ed. 1899) S. 460; 1 RUTHERFORD, INST. 345: 1 BL., COMM. *433; 1 BISHOP,
supra, SS. 239, 313, 315, 317.
"L. R. A. 1915 E (57 L. R. A., N. S.) ANNO. 8, n. 25.
2
Followed in Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 108 Colo. 388, 118
Pac. (2d) 769 (1941).
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Thus, in one case the expression of the court was used to state a
proved or admitted fact, while in the others, the contract of marriage
was sought to be proven by cohabitation and habit and repute, and the
court merely stated that the cohabitation of the parties, or their reputa-
tion, is evidence of a marriage.
We believe that in Colorado, marriage, though the most solemn of
all contracts, is yet but a contract.- Proof of the contract alone is suffi-
cient to constitute a valid common law marriage, but where the contract
is denied or cannot be shown, or is based upon an implied understanding,
mutual assent may be inferred from cohabitation or repute.
1 4
If marriage is but a civil contract, made in the same manner as other
contracts, there is no reason why it cannot be entered into through an
agent. The mere presence of the parties at the time of the agreement is
not essential to the formation of an agreement.' Nor can we logically
say that the formation of such a contract is so personal in nature, or so
immoral, that it cannot be delegated to an agent. The mere making of
the contract is not personal in nature; only the status resulting therefrom
is personal. If a general authority were given to an agent to select a
spouse for one, at the agent's own discretion, it would be invalid, 1
Meechem, Agency (2nd ed. 1914) S. 126. Then it would be analogous
to marriage brokerage contracts, which are uniformly regarded contrary
to public policy. But a special authority given, and especially during
war time, should be valid if the marriage contract is no different from
other contracts.
Suppose our soldier in Australia, prompted by religious reasons,
desires a church ceremony and in a form prescribed by statute. May he
solemnize such marriage with his fiancee in Colorado through an agent
who appears for him at the ceremonial marriage?'6 Failure to conform
0f course an informal marriage may be invalid for other reasons: viz., incapacity
of parties; that the mutual promises are not consistent with the essentials of marriages.
There must be more than a promise to live together; the relation must be mutually ex-
clusive of marriage with someone else. Taylor v. Taylor, supra note 7. There must be
an expression of present consent. In re estate of Danikas (Ryan v. Cordas) , 76 Colo.
191, 230 Pac. 608 (1924). It cannot be a contract for future marriage. Radovich v.
Radovich, 84 Colo. 250, 269 Pac. 22 (1928).
1In support of its holding in Peters v. Peters, supra p. 285, the court cites the
leading American cases for the view that cohabitation and habit and repute are not neces-
sary to constitute a valid common law marriage: viz., David v. Stouffer. 132 Mo. A.
555, 112 S. W. 28 (1908), and Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31
(1896), but in these cases cohabitation was a proven or admitted fact and the discus-
sion was dictum. The doctrine has been upheld expressly in Great Northern Ry. v.
Johnson, supra note 4 (also cited), and in Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47 (N. Y. Sup.
1828), 22 Am. Dec. 563 (1881), and U. S. v. Simpson, 4 Utah 227, 7 Pac. 257
(1885).
'Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, supra note 4: Ex Parte Suzanna, supra p. 283.
"0 We note in the Denver ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 27, 1943, that a mar-
riage was thus solemnized in Denver, the groom being represented by his father, who
held a power of attorney.
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with the formalities prescribed by statute should not affect the validity
of such marriage as a common law marriage.'7 But we believe that such
a formal marriage ceremony ought to be sustained as a formal marriage
prescribed by statute, for if our statute does not expressly require the
personal presence of both parties there is no reason why an agent may
not go through the formalities of making a solemn contract for his prin-
cipal. The only difference between a formal marriage as prescribed by
statute and a common law marriage is in the method of expressing
consent."'
Nowhere in our statute is the personal presence of the parties re-
quired. The application for marriage license need be made by only one
of the parties; premarital examinations need not be made in Colorado
nor filed in person, 4 1935 C. S. A., C. 107, S. 5. It has been contended
that the requirement of personal presence of both parties can be found in
the certificate of marriage, which recites that the officer has solemnized
the rites of matrimony of A and B in the presence of two witnesse's, ibid.
S. 12, but the certificate does not state that A and B were personally
present. In this form the ceremony itself is the thing attested by wit-
nesses, not the personal appearance of the parties. It is axiomatic that
statutory regulations of marriage are construed as directory only and are
interpreted merely as directions to the solemnizing officer."' Indeed, since
in Colorado marriage rests upon the fact of consent, it would follow
logically that marriage might be contracted by proxy, although neither
of the parties was present when the consent was exchanged by the parties.
Further problems might well be suggested: What under our law is
the proper mode of appointing an agent to execute such a formal con-
tract for his principal? If marriage can result from an informal contract
no particular form of appointment should be required. The agent's
authority may be conferred orally or in writing, provided it can be
sufficiently proven and clearly discloses the principal's intention, the
identity of the agent and what he is to do."'
If the agent makes out the application for license and must acknowl-
edge it for purposes of representing his principal in a solemnized mar-
riage ceremony, perhaps he should have written authorization verified by
his principal. We doubt that failure to verify such application will in-
validate the marriage, once the agency is proven.
Surely, it is advisable that the agency be conferred by writing and
verified, and should clearly disclose the principal's intention, identify
the agent and prospective spouse, and should show what the agent is to
1739 A. L. R. ANNO. 538 (1925) : Taylor v. Taylor. supra note 7.
"SCatlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933).
1l BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 10, SS. 403, 423-449.
'2 C. J. S., S. 26, p. 1055. An agent need not have written authority to make
a simple written contract.
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do. A seal is not necessary. The agent's authority should be clear and
decisive.1
MARRIAGES BY CORRESPONDENCE OR TELEPHONE
If Colorado recognizes common law marriages without requiring
cohabitation or personal presence as essential elements thereof, then an
American soldier abroad should be able to enter into a valid marriage by
mail if the one to whom he addresses his offer of marriage accepts it in
Colorado. Surely, it would be simpler to create the marriage status by
the exchange of consents through the mail. Great Northern Railway v.
Johnson, supra note 4, expressly holds that a marriage by correspond-
ence is valid if valid by the law of the state from which the acceptance
was sent. It has been stated that under the correct common law doctrine
a valid marriage might be contracted by mail.2 2 Indeed, if a marriage by
proxy is recognized under the common law there is no reason why we
should require personal presence for a marriage created by correspond-
ence. Marriage being but a civil contract, the rules to be applied should
be the same as are applied to ordinary contracts. Personal presence of the
parties should add nothing to the formation of their agreement. By
what law will the validity of such marriages be governed? Under estab-
lished principles of conflicts of law the law of the place of celebration will
control the validity of a marriage. This will be where the contract is
made. As to an ordinary contract the general rule is that the place where
made is the place where the acceptance is mailed. Thus, if the acceptance
were mailed in Colorado, the marriage should here be valid. While mar-
riage creates a status there is no reason for applying a different rule.2 3 In
predicting that our court would uphold such a marriage we are guided
by Peters v. Peters, where the court followed and rested its position upon
the authority of the Great Northern Railway case.
By the same token marriages by telephone should be valid in Colo-
rado, at least they should be upheld as valid common law marriages. An
informal contract may be made over the telephone. 24 Such marriages un-
doubtedly would be subjected to the keenest scrutiny of our courts. The
vagaries of war may justify unique ways of contracting marriages, but
public policy will require the clearest proof of such contracts. What law
will govern such a marriage? Applying the rule as to ordinary contracts,
it would seem that the place from which the accepting party speaks
"1Thus, in Hawaii v. Li Shee, 12 Hawaii 329 (1899), the court held that assum-
ing the marriage by proxy was valid, there was no proof that the proxy was given or
that the alleged husband consented.
21 BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 10, S. 325: SWINBOURNE, ESPOUSALS (2d ed.)
162, 181-183.
"Coad v. Coad, 87 Neb. 290, 292, 127 N. W. 455, 457 (1910). This was
the reasoning of the Great Northern Railway case, supra note 4.
2'17 C. J. S. 400, n. 77.
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would be the place of celebration. If, therefore, made in Colorado, it
should be valid. There is more doubt whether our courts would uphold
such marriage as a ceremonial one prescribed by statute. Elsewhere it
has been held that an oath cannot be administered by telephone, 25 nor
can a wife acknowledge her husband's deed over the telephone.2'
But if our statute does not require the personal presence of both par-
ties, as we have contended, and if its prescribed formalities are merely
directory, as the Colorado supreme court has held, such a marriage should
be sustained as a valid ceremonial marriage. Our argument is that a
marriage by telephone, and its preliminaries, may so be arranged that it
will comply substantially with the prescribed statutory form. It should
then be accorded recognition not as a common law marriage, but as a
valid statutory one.
It may well be that by upholding such marriages we are making
more uncertain and formless the one contract which ought to be the
most formal and certain. However, such marriages may furnish the only
devices available for our soldiers abroad to contract marriages. So far
as the logic of our law is concerned such marriages should be valid. It is
for our legislature to say whether they should be forbidden upon grounds
of public policy.
'Sullivan v. First Natl. Bank, 37 Tex. Civ. A. 228, 83 S. W. 421 (1904)
Carnesv. Carnes, 138 Ga. 1, 74 S. E. 785 (1912).
'Wester v. Hurt, 123 Tenn. 508, 130 S. W. 842 (1910). But see Banning v.
Banning, 80 Calif. 271, 22 Pac. 210 (1889), and Abernathy v. Harris, 183 Ark. 22,
34 S. W. (2d) 765 (1931).
